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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 004688

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC. EZ, AR, NI, MU. RW

SUBJECT: UN SECURITY COUNCIL: ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION WITH
NEW MEMBERS

REF: STATE 373531

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUESTED; SEE
PARA 2.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 NOV 2011 201005065

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2. ON JANUARY 1 ARGENTINA THE CZECH REPUBLIC. NIGERIA, OMAN AND RWANDA WILL JOIN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC), REPLACING VENEZUELA. HUNGARY, CAPE VERDE, JAPAN AND MOROCCO. THIS CABLE CONTAINS MATERIAL ON MAJOR ISSUES LIKELY TO CONFRONT THE COUNCIL IN 1994. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD MEET WITH APPROPRIATE SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY AND DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL TO DISCUSS USG HOPES FOR THEIR GOVERNMENTS' PARTICIPATION IN THE UNSC. (REFTTEL CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS FOR RAISING IRAQI SANCTIONS WITH THE NEW UNSC MEMBERS.)

PEACEKEEPING

3. THE GROWING NUMBER OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
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AROUND THE WORLD AND THE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THOSE OPERATIONS HAVE SHOWN THAT. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE USEFUL TOOLS TO CONTAIN, RESOLVE AND PREVENT CONFLICT, THEY ARE NOT A PANACEA. TO DEAL WITH RAPIDLY MOUNTING PEACEKEEPING DEMANDS AND LIMIT THE CONCOMITANT RISING COSTS, THE COUNCIL HAS BEGUN TO DEVELOP CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL STANDARDS AGAINST WHICH TO JUDGE EACH NEW PEACEKEEPING PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA, WHICH PRESIDENT CLINTON DISCUSSED IN HIS SEPTEMBER 27 REMARKS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ARE APPROPRIATE; MOST HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COUNCIL:

- IS THERE A REAL THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE?
- DOES THE PROPOSED MISSION HAVE CLEAR OBJECTIVES?
- CAN AN END POINT BE IDENTIFIED FOR THOSE WHO WILL BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE?
- HOW MUCH WILL THE MISSION COST/

WE HOPE THAT NEW COUNCIL MEMBERS WILL JOIN US IN APPLYING THESE TESTS AS NEW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COUNCIL.

AFRICA

4. THE NEED TO APPLY THESE TESTS IS MOST EVIDENT IN AFRICA. WHERE THE NUMBER OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAS

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TENSION IN MANY COUNTRIES MAY PRESAGE ADDITIONAL REQUESTS
FOR SUCH OPERATIONS.

5. ALTHOUGH THE UN CAN HELP CONTAIN AND PREVENT CONFLICT,
EXPERIENCE IN SOMALIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAS DEMONSTRATED
THAT PARTIES TO CONFLICTS MUST TAKE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MAKING THE POLITICAL PROCESS WORK. GIVEN THE
BURGEONING DEMANDS FOR PEACEKEEPING AND THE SCARCE
RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THEM, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE
AN INCREASED ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING BY REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO HELP THE UN MEET ITS GOALS. FOR EXAMPLE,
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) IS ORGANIZING A
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION FOR BURUNDI, AND THE ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) HAS BEEN
CONDUCTING AN OPERATION IN LIBERIA FOR SOME TIME.

6. SOON AFTER THE NEW MEMBERS TAKE THEIR PLACE ON THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, IT WILL BE FACED WITH SEVERAL KEY
DECISIONS ON AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS. WE ARE
PLACING INCREASING EMPHASIS ON DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS
TOWARDS PEACE IN THESE CONFLICTS.

7. IF THE TALKS IN LUSAKA ARE SUCCESSFUL AND BOTH UNITA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA DEMONSTRATE A COMMITMENT TO A
VIABLE AND SUSTAINABLE CEASE FIRE, THE COUNCIL FACES THE
POSSIBILITY OF A GREATLY EXPANDED OPERATION (UNAVEM) IN
ANGOLA. WE WILL WANT TO PUT IN PLACE A PEACEKEEPING
OPERATION WHICH IS LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT THE PEACE
AGREEMENT EFFECTIVELY, WHILE KEEPING COSTS TO AN
ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

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8. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED NATIONS HAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED ALL
OF ITS GOALS IN SOMALIA. FIRST UNITAF AND THEN UNOSOM HAVE
SUCCEEDED IN ENDING THE FAMINE AND CIVIL DISORDER THAT
PREVAILED, AND UNOSOM IS HELPING CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN
WHICH ECONOMIC REVIVAL CAN TAKE PLACE. AS MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS. WE SUPPORT UNOSOM AND FULLY INTEND TO
REMAIN ENGAGED IN SOMALIA AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF OUR
TROOPS, AND WE EXPECT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REMAIN
ENGAGED AS WELL. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST STABLE
REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY AND WILL JOIN OTHER COUNTRIES IN

FORMER SOVIET UNION

9. A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE CATEGORY OF POTENTIAL NEW PEACEKEEPING DEMANDS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS CONFLICTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. WE BELIEVE THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONSIDER THESE CONFLICTS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES, BOTH FOR TRADITIONAL UN ("BLUE-HELMET") PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND FOR RUSSIAN OR MULTINATIONAL REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES.

10. TRADITIONAL UN OPERATIONS MUST OF COURSE, MEET THE STANDARDS LISTED IN PARA 3, ABOVE. FOR NON-UN FORCES, WE WOULD EXAMINE ADDITIONAL CRITERIA BEFORE SUPPORTING A UN ENDORSEMENT:

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-- A PEACEKEEPING FORCE MUST BE DESIRED AND CONSENTED TO BY THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE.

-- THE FORCE'S ROLE MUST BE NEUTRAL AND CARRIED OUT UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER AND, IF APPLICABLE, CSCE.

-- THERE MUST BE SOME FORM OF OBJECTIVE (UN OR CSCE) OVERSIGHT OF THE FORCE.

-- THE FORCE'S ROLE MUST CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE. SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE STATES INVOLVED.

-- FINANCING OF THE FORCE CANNOT BE BASED ON ASSESSMENTS OF UN MEMBERS. WHILE WE WOULD CONSIDER SUPPORTING CREATION OF A VOLUNTARY FUND TO SUPPORT A FORCE. WE MIGHT NOT NECESSARILY CONTRIBUTE TO THE FUND OURSELVES.

-- AS WITH ALL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, A KEY ELEMENT WOULD BE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROCESS AIMED AT ACHIEVING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.

EX-YUGOSLAVIA

11. THE INTENSITY OF COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA HAS DIMINISHED IN THE LAST HALF-YEAR. WE DO NOT FORESEE A REQUIREMENT FOR MAJOR, NEW SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVES UNTIL A PEACE SETTLEMENT IS REACHED. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK INCLUDES: A TIGHT
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SANCTIONS REGIME ON SERBIA; A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE REGIME, WITH PROVISION FOR PROTECTION OF THE DELIVERY SYSTEM AND OF ITS RECIPIENTS, BOTH ON THE GROUND (UNFROFOR) AND IN THE AIR; AN ARMS EMBARGO; A WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL; A NO-FLY ZONE. IN ADDITION, THE COUNCIL HAS SUPPORTED, BUT HAS PLAYED NO DIRECT ROLE IN, EFFORTS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA.

12. CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA COULD PRODUCE NEW SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, E.G., SHOULD THE UNSTABLE MODUS VIVENDI IN CROATIA BREAK DOWN. BARRING MAJOR CHANGES, HOWEVER, THE COUNCIL'S NEXT IMPORTANT DECISIONS WILL MOST LIKELY FOCUS ON A BOSNIA PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN THIS CASE. THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE A NUMBER OF VITAL QUESTIONS: (1) WHAT FORCES SHOULD ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING A PEACE AGREEMENT. AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES; (2) WHAT ELEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED TO DETER AGGRESSION AND TO ASSIST AND PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WOULD NEED TO BE ALTERED --

ESPECIALLY THE SANCTIONS REGIME.

13. THE NATURE OF AN AGREEMENT WILL AFFECT COUNCIL ACTION ON BOTH THESE ISSUES. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF AN IMPLEMENTATION FORCE WILL DEPEND ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS. INCLUDING THE GEOGRAPHIC BASIS OF THE SETTLEMENT AND THE ATTITUDE OF ALL THE PARTIES TOWARD THE AGREEMENT. WE REALIZE THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO POSE A BURDEN FOR MANY COUNTRIES AND THE PACE AND SEQUENCE OF DISMANTLING THE SANCTIONS REGIME COULD BE CONTENTIOUS. WE WILL WANT COUNCIL MEMBERS. BACKING FOR TYING ANY

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SANCTIONS MODERATION TO DEMONSTRATED GOOD-FAITH SERB ACTIONS IN IMPLEMENTING A SETTLEMENT IN BOSNIA AND TYING THE FINAL SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS TO A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT IN THE SERB AREAS OF CROATIA AND TO A SATISFACTORY SITUATION ON KOSOVO AS WELL.

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LIBYA

14. UNSCR 883. ADOPTED NOVEMBER 11, EXPANDS UN SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA TO INCLUDE THE LIMITED FREEZING OF LIBYA'S OVERSEAS FINANCIAL ASSETS AND A BAN ON THE SALE TO LIBYA OF OIL TRANSPORT AND REFINING EQUIPMENT. THE NEW SANCTIONS CAME INTO EFFECT DECEMBER 1. WITH THE ADOPTION OF UNSCR 883, WE COUNT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO REMAIN STEADFAST IN MAINTAINING PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE LIBYAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UNSCR 731 AND 748.

15. THE TERMS OF THESE THREE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE. LIBYA KNOWS WHAT IT HAS TO DO TO COMPLY: TURN OVER THOSE INDICTED FOR THE BOMBING OF PAN AM 103 TO BRITISH OR AMERICAN COURTS; COOPERATE WITH THE FRENCH JUDICIARY; PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE VICTIMS OF LIBYAN TERRORISM; AND CONFIRM ITS RENUNCIATION OF TERRORISM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REMAINS THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LIBYA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE NO HIDDEN AGENDA WITH RESPECT TO LIBYA. LIBYA'S OBLIGATIONS ARE CLEAR. WE HAVE NOT, AND WILL NOT, RESPOND SUBSTANTIVELY TO THE MANY INTERMEDIARIES THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS ENGAGED. OUR FOCUS NOW IS ON RIGOROUS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW SANCTIONS.

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NORTH KOREA

16. NORTH KOREA'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

(NPT), AS DETERMINED BY THE IAEA BOARD ON FEBRUARY 25, 1993, AND NORTH KOREA'S MARCH 12 ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NPT, POSE GRAVE THREATS TO THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND TO THE SECURITY OF NORTHEAST ASIA.

17. THE U.S.. RESPONDING TO THE MAY 11 UNSCR 825 WHICH URGED MEMBER NATIONS TO ASSIST IN SEEKING A SOLUTION. HAS ENGAGED NORTH KOREA IN THE FIRST EVER U.S.-DPRK BILATERAL TALKS.

18. IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL HANS BLIX INDICATED TO THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS IN EARLY DECEMBER THAT NORTH KOREA'S

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REFUSAL TO PERMIT REGULAR INSPECTIONS HAS LED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SYSTEM CANNOT BE SAID AT PRESENT TO PROVIDE ANY MEANINGFUL ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL USE OF THE DPRK'S DECLARED NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND MATERIAL. THE U.S. HAS TOLD NORTH KOREA THAT IF THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS IS FULLY BROKEN. THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO BREAK OFF THE DIALOGUE.

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19. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MOST RECENTLY MADE KNOWN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE IAEA'S EFFORTS TO GAIN NORTH KOREA'S COOPERATION ON INSPECTIONS BY VOTING 140 TO 1 IN THE UN

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON NOVEMBER 1 FOR A RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR IAEA INSPECTIONS.

20. A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR INTENTIONS REQUIRES THAT IT: REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE NPT; COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE IAEA; AND AGREE TO IMPLEMENT COMPLETELY THE JOINT NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

21. THE U.S. PREFERS DIPLOMACY AND DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. BUT IF PROGRESS TOWARD A RESOLUTION BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE BY THESE MEANS. WE WILL RETURN THE ISSUE TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR FURTHER MEASURES.
CHRISTOPHER

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